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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Juan Carlos Maldonado appeals from the judgment entered upon the jury verdicts
finding him guilty of felony domestic battery and of being a persistent violator. On appeal,
Maldonado argues (1) the trial court abused its discretion by admitting statements the
victim made during medical examinations by a paramedic and (later) a Physician’s
Assistant, (2) the trial court erred by denying his motion for a mistrial after the state
mistakenly gained admission of, and published to the jury, an unredacted version of the
victim’s recorded statements to police in which she said Maldonado had been in prison
before, and (3) even if the errors he alleges are deemed individually harmless, the
cumulative effect of the errors warrants reversal.

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Maldonado with domestic battery – traumatic injury (felony) and
with being a persistent violator. (R., pp.37-40.) Maldonado pled not guilty and the case
proceeded to trial. (R., pp.41, 78-103, 106-116.) At the conclusion of the trial, the jury
found Maldonado guilty of both the charge and the enhancement. (R., pp.117-119.) The
district court sentenced Maldonado to a unified sentence of 20 years with six years fixed.
(R., pp.154-155.) Maldonado filed a Rule 35 motion for reduction of sentence, which was
denied. (R., pp.175-177; 8/29/17 Order Denying Rule 35 Motion.) Maldonado timely
appealed. (R., pp.165-167, 191-195.)
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ISSUES
Maldonado states the issues on appeal as:
I.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it allowed hearsay
statements regarding the identity of Ms. Maldonado’s assailant to be
admitted?

II.

Did the district court err in denying the motion for a mistrial made
after the State played an audio in which Ms. Maldonado told law
enforcement that Mr. Maldonado had previously been in prison for
a long time?

III.

Even if the above errors are individually harmless, was Mr.
Maldonado’s Fourteenth Amendment right to due process of law
violated because the accumulation of errors deprived him of his right
to a fair trial?

(Appellant’s Brief, p.3.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1. Has Maldonado failed to show that the district court abused its discretion by admitting
statements the victim made during medical examinations to the paramedic and the
Physician’s Assistant identifying Maldonado as the assailant?
2. Has Maldonado failed to show that the district court erred in denying his motion for a
mistrial?
3. Has Maldonado failed to show cumulative error?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Maldonado Has Failed To Show That The District Court Abused Its Discretion By
Admitting Statements The Victim Made To The Paramedic And The Physician’s
Assistant Identifying Maldonado As The Assailant
A.

Introduction
Maldonado argues that the trial court abused its discretion by permitting the state

to introduce, during its opening statement and case-in-chief, statements by the victim
(Maldonado’s wife, Nellie) 1 to a treating paramedic (Haley Glenn) and a treating
Physician’s Assistant (David Nelson) that identified Maldonado as the person who battered
her. As he did below, Maldonado contends that, contrary to I.R.E. 803(4), the identity of
the person who inflicted Nellie’s injuries was not “reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or
treatment,” and, therefore, the challenged statements were inadmissible hearsay.
(Appellant’s Brief, pp.4-18.)
Maldonado’s argument fails.

Idaho’s appellate courts have not specifically

determined whether the identity of a perpetrator is, or can be, “reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment” under I.R.E. 803(4). However, a review of the record and of the
generally applicable law supports the trial court’s determination that the challenged
statements were reasonably pertinent to the medical diagnosis and treatment of Nellie, and
admissible under I.R.E. 803(4). Even assuming the trial court abused its discretion in
admitting the challenged “identification” portions of Nellie’s statements, any such error
was harmless and did not affect Maldonado’s substantial rights.

1

At trial, Nellie denied that Maldonado was the person who battered her. (11/18/16 Tr.,
p.56, Ls.13-17; p.60, L.21 – p.61, L.5; p.67, Ls.2-5.)
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B.

Standard Of Review
A trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence is generally reviewed for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 218, 245 P.3d 961, 970 (2010); State v.
Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51, 205 P.3d 1185, 1187 (2009). In reviewing a discretionary decision,
the appellate court “examine[s] whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as
discretionary; (2) the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with
applicable legal standards: and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise
of reason.” Id. (citations omitted); accord State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 363, 247
P.3d 582, 590 (2010) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted).

C.

Maldonado Has Failed To Show The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion By
Permitting The State To Present Nellie’s Statements To The Paramedic And The
Physician’s Assistant Identifying Him As Her Assailant
Prior to jury selection, the prosecutor informed the trial court that he intended to

“introduce evidence that the victim told two separate medical providers about her injuries
and who injured her[,]” pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4) as “statements made for the purposes of
medical diagnosis or treatment.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.14, L.20 – p.15, L.2.) Maldonado has
failed to show that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting those statements under
I.R.E. 803(4).
Hearsay is “a statement, other than one made by the declarant while testifying at
the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” I.R.E.
801(c). Hearsay evidence is generally inadmissible. I.R.E. 802. However, I.R.E. 803(4)
specifically excepts from the hearsay rule statements made for purposes of medical
diagnosis or treatment. Specifically, the rule provides that the following are not excluded
by the hearsay rule, regardless of whether the declarant is available as a witness:
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Statements for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. Statements
made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical
history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the source
thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.
I.R.E. 803(4).
The rationale behind this firmly-rooted hearsay exception is that statements made
for purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment are “generally trustworthy because the
declarant is motivated by a desire to receive proper medical treatment and will therefore
be truthful in giving pertinent information to the physician.” State v. Nelson, 131 Idaho
210, 215, 953 P.2d 650, 655 (Ct. App. 1998) (citing State v. Kay, 129 Idaho 507, 518, 927
P.2d 897, 908 (Ct. App. 1996)). This is especially true where, as here, the hearsay declarant
is an adult. In such cases, “the motive to speak the truth to a physician in order to advance
a self-interest in obtaining proper medical care for the declarant or another is generally
assumed.” Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908.
In order to qualify as a statement made for purposes of medical diagnosis or
treatment, admissible pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4), the out-of-court statement(s) sought to be
introduced must meet three foundational requirements:
The proponent must show: (1) that the statements were “made for purposes
of medical diagnosis or treatment”; (2) that the statements described
“medical history, or past or present symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the
source thereof”; and (3) that the statements were “reasonably pertinent to
diagnosis or treatment.”
Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. See also Nelson, 131 Idaho at 216, 953 P.2d at
656. So long as there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that these foundational
requisites have been satisfied, the trial court’s decision to admit a statement as one made
for the purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment will not be disturbed on appeal. Nelson,
131 Idaho at 215-16, 953 P.2d at 655-56; Kay, 129 Idaho at 518-19, 927 P.2d at 908-09.
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Applying these principles in this case, it is clear that the district court did not abuse
its discretion in allowing Paramedic Glenn and Physician’s Assistant Nelson to testify
about Nellie’s identification of Maldonado as her assailant.

1. Nellie’s Statement To Paramedic Haley Glenn
After jury selection, the prosecutor advised the trial court that he wanted to tell the
jury in his opening statement that, after the EMT (Haley Glenn) “asked Nellie what
happened[,]” Nellie “told her significant other had punched her multiple times in the head.”
(11/17/16 Tr., p.217, Ls.8-12 (emphasis added).) In ruling on the state’s request, the court
explained that the identification of the perpetrator was “intertwined with the statement[,]”
that it “may or may not be pertinent to their diagnosis[,]” but that “it also becomes one of
those facts that’s inescapable. It’s not like a separate series of things that occurred.” 2
(11/17/16 Tr., p.222, L.25 – p.223, L.7.) The court permitted the state to “make that
comment during opening statement[,]” and noted Maldonado’s standing objection to the
state’s request. (11/17/16 Tr., p.223, Ls.10-18.)

2

On the second day of trial, the trial court further explained how Nellie “relayed this
information to EMT Glenn,[,]” stating:
[Nellie had] been waken [sic] up in the morning by her boyfriend
leaving. They’d been arguing. The argument escalated, it became physical
and he began punching her in the face and torso.
It appears to me the identity of the perpetrator in that presentation to
the EMT is so intertwined with the patient’s description of events . . . .
....
And therefore, the reliability of that statement doesn’t appear to be
a basis to separate that, because it seems to be intertwined with the
information that’s being collected.”
(11/18/16 Tr., p.14, L.22 – p.15, L.16.)
6

During opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury: “[Haley Glenn] asked
Nellie what happened. And Nellie said her significant other that morning had punched her
repeatedly in the face and hit her in the ribs.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.249, Ls.11-14.)
At trial, Ms. Glenn testified that on the morning of May 31, 2016, she was working
as a Canyon County Paramedic when she responded to a Nampa residence and, after
waiting about 46 minutes before making contact with anyone at the scene, she went inside
and saw Nellie sitting on a couch in the living room. (11/17/16 Tr., p.319, L.11 – p.321,
L.20.) Nellie had bruising on both sides of her face and the bridge of her nose, and her lip
was swollen. (11/17/16 Tr., p.322, Ls.6-10.)

Ms. Glenn testified that when she asked

Nellie what happened, Nellie said “her significant other had woken her up, got into an
argument with her. It escalated, became physical in nature and went from there for about
30 minutes.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.322, L.14 – p.323, L.5.) Ms. Glenn further testified:
She told me that her significant other had woken her up and began
arguing with her. About what, I do not know. But that the argument
escalated and became physical and he began punching her in the face and
the torso.
(11/17/16 Tr., p.324, Ls.12-16.) The paramedics transported Nellie to a hospital by
ambulance. (11/17/16 Tr., p.325, Ls.15-18.)
Although Ms. Glenn testified on direct examination that Nellie said her “significant
other” had battered her (11/17/16 Tr., p.324, Ls.9-16), on cross-examination she clarified
that Nellie actually used the term “boyfriend,” and that she (Ms. Glenn) wrote “significant
other” in her report because she felt “like it painted a better picture[,]” and to her,
“[s]ignificant other . . . is boyfriend.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.329, L.7 – p.330, L.1.) Ms. Glenn
also denied that the identity of the person who battered Nellie was necessary for medical
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diagnosis or treatment, and agreed that “just primarily . . . the mechanism of injury” was
necessary for that purpose. (11/17/16 Tr., p.328, Ls.16-22.)
Despite the fact that Ms. Glenn’s testimony did not provide a foundation for
concluding that the identity of the perpetrator was reasonably pertinent to Nellie’s medical
diagnosis or treatment, the district court correctly concluded that the perpetrator’s identity
was intertwined with those portions of Nellie’s statement that were pertinent to those
purposes and “becomes one of those facts that’s inescapable,” 3 “not like a separate series
of things that occurred.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.222, L.25 – p.223, L.7.)
As the trial court surmised, segregating the identification portion of Nellie’s
statement from the rest of her statement to Ms. Glenn would have been problematic.
Nellie’s statement that she was woken up out of her sleep and punched repeatedly during
an argument that ensued would have made it implausible to conceal the fact that
Maldonado was the only other person with her at the time: Nellie testified that she and
Maldonado had been staying together in the downstairs of the house a couple of days before
the incident, and got into an argument after he woke her up that morning; Maldonado told
Detective Wilber he was with Nellie on the morning of the incident, he told the women
who came downstairs to intervene in the argument that they should stay out of it, and he
was angry when he argued with Nellie. (11/18/16 Tr., p.55, L.21 – p.57, L.24; p.140, L.17
– p.141, L.10; see generally State’s Ex. 6.) Any attempt to omit the obvious identity of the
perpetrator from Nellie’s statement would have been impractical and pointless.

3

The recorded statements of Miriam Murillo and Janell Ozuna (State Exhibits. 22, 24),
admitted as substantive evidence under I.R.E. 804(b)(5), leave little doubt that Maldonado
was the person who battered Nellie early on the morning of May 31, 2016. (See section C,
infra, for a more detailed discussion of statements by Ms. Murillo and Ms. Ozuna.)
8

Maldonado has failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in allowing
Ms. Glenn to testify about Nellie’s identification of the person who battered her.

2. Nellie’s Statement To Physician’s Assistant David Nelson
After Nellie was transported to the hospital on May 31, 2016, Physician’s Assistant
David Nelson assessed and treated her injuries. (11/18/16 Tr., p.41, L.21 – p.42, L.7.)
During his opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the Physician’s Assistant is
“going to tell you what Nellie told him had occurred[,]” but the prosecutor did not tell the
jury at that point that Nellie identified Maldonado as her assailant. (11/17/16 Tr., p.249,
Ls.14-21.) At the start of the second day of trial, Maldonado’s attorney’s told the court he
anticipated that the state was going to admit evidence of “who the assailant was” through
Mr. Nelson’s testimony about what Nellie told him, and that he would object to such
testimony. (11/18/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.14-21.) After the prosecutor confirmed that he was
going to present such testimony, the court (at the request of defense counsel) allowed the
prosecutor to lay a foundation for Mr. Nelson to testify about why Nellie’s identification
of Maldonado was related to her medical diagnosis or treatment. (11/18/16 Tr., p.10, L.
23 – p.11, L.10.)
In relevant part, Mr. Nelson testified outside the presence of the jury that: (1) he
uses the “SOAP” method to assess patients, which stands for “subjective objective
assessment and plan” (11/18/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.17-21; p.28, L.19 – p.29, L.5); (2) during the
“subjective” portion of the patient assessment he asks open-ended questions such as “What
brings you in today?” and writes down what the patient says (id., p.17, Ls.20-24; p.20,
Ls.21-23); (3) it is important to know whether it was a man or a woman who assaulted a
patient because of the need to know how large the person was who inflicted the injury (id.,
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p.19, Ls.22-24; p.19, Ls.5-9; p.22, Ls.7-19); (4) if mentioned by the patient, the identity of
the perpetrator is something he would write down in the medical chart so “the next provider
can read and say, oh, this is how these injuries were sustained” (id., p.25, Ls.2-19); and (5)
he agreed “it would be pertinent to write that it was her husband, because some later
physician may read this, see additional injuries, look back at this, see evidence of abuse in
the past” (id., p.26, Ls.4-10).
The trial court ruled that the state could present the “identity” portion of Nellie’s
statement to Mr. Nelson, explaining that once the patient responds to the open-ended
questioning during the subjective phase of the assessment, the Physician’s Assistant
“glean[s] what is pertinent from what the patient says.” (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.7-17.) The
court explained that determining whether the assailant was a man, woman, or child “is
pertinent to [the] evaluation.” 4 (11/18/16 Tr., p.29, Ls.12-17.) The court also stated that
Nellie’s identification of Maldonado as the assailant was “intertwined with the statement
made for medical diagnosis,” which, as discussed above with regard to Ms. Glenn’s
testimony, was well-founded. (11/18/16 Tr., p.30, Ls.13-15.)
Further, although the trial court did not mention it in its ruling, it should nonetheless
be considered that, according to Mr. Nelson, the identity of the assailant was pertinent to
Nellie’s medical diagnosis or treatment so that a “later physician may read [it], see
additional injuries, [and] look back at this, [and] see evidence of abuse in the past.”
(11/18/16 Tr., p.26, Ls.4-10.) See State v. Stewart, 149 Idaho 383, 388, 234 P.3d 707, 712
(2010) (affirming denial of motion on correct theory, one not reached by trial court);

4

According to Mr. Nelson, knowing the size of an assailant is important for understanding
the “mechanism of their injuries.” (11/18/16 Tr., p.19, Ls.18-24; p.22, Ls.14-19.)
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McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 700, 992 P.2d 144, 149 (1999) (if trial court reaches
the correct result by erroneous theory, appellate court will affirm upon the correct theory).
The trial court was correct. Mr. Nelson‘s foundational testimony established that
the identity of the person who battered Nellie was “reasonably pertinent to [her] diagnosis
and treatment.” Kay, 129 Idaho at 518, 927 P.2d at 908. Because the challenged statement
was made for the purposes of medical diagnosis and treatment, the district court properly
admitted it pursuant to I.R.E. 803(4). 5

D.

Even If The Trial Court Abused Its Discretion In Admitting The Challenged
Statements, The Error Was Harmless
Even if a trial court has abused its discretion, such “abuse of discretion may be

deemed harmless if a substantial right is not affected. In the case of an incorrect ruling
regarding evidence, this Court will grant relief on appeal only if the error affects a
substantial right of one of the parties.” Shackelford, 150 Idaho at 363, 247 P.3d at 590
(citation omitted). See also State v. Watkins, 148 Idaho 418, 420, 224 P.3d 485, 487 (2009)
(“Unless an error affects a substantial right of a party, the error does not constitute grounds
for reversal.” (Citation omitted)).
Here, assuming the district court abused its discretion in admitting one or both of
the Nellie’s statements to Paramedic Glenn and Physician’s Assistant Nelson, the error did
not affect Maldonado’s substantial rights. First, Maldonado’s defense completely centered
on Nellie’s extensive testimony that her “boyfriend” Victor battered her the night before,
and that, in order to protect Victor, she initially blamed Maldonado for her injuries.

5

During his trial testimony, Mr. Nelson told the jury that Nellie said she was assaulted by
her “husband” early in the morning in her home, and that he punched her several times in
the face and chest. (11/18/16 Tr., p.44, Ls.17-25; p.48, L.15 – p.49, L.11.)
11

(11/18/16 Tr., p.58, Ls.3-14; p.64, L.6 – p.65, L.11; p.70, L.25 – p.71, L.10; p.72, Ls.1221; p.75, L.6 – p.77, L.7.) Regardless of any error in its admission, Ms. Glenn’s testimony
that Nellie said that the person who battered her was her “boyfriend” was totally supportive
of Maldonado’s defense. (See 11/17/16 Tr., p.329, L.7 – p.330, L.1.)
As discussed, Maldonado told Detective Wilber he was with Nellie on the morning
of the incident and they were arguing when the two women tried to intervene. He told the
women they should stay out of it, and he was angry with Nellie at the time because she
would not account for her facial injuries. (11/18/16 Tr., p.55, L.21 – p.57, L.24; p.140,
L.17 – p.141, L.10; see generally State’s Ex. 6.) Nellie testified to the underlying facts that
Maldonado woke her up at 5:00 a.m. that morning, and that Janell and Jeanette (Miriam
Murrilo) came downstairs to the door as Maldonado yelled at Nellie and told her to stop
lying about her boyfriend. 6 (11/18/16 Tr., p.7, Ls.5-8; p.57, L.9 – p.58, L.5.)
Also incriminating are Maldonado’s jail calls to Nellie and the recorded statements
of Miriam Murillo and Janell Ozuna.

1. First Jail Call
A close approximation of the most relevant parts of the first jail call from
Maldonado to Nellie, made on May 31, 2016, the day of the crime, is as follows:
Maldonado:

I told them that you came home all crushed up and that’s
why we were arguing, because someone had texted you . . .
but you wouldn’t tell me . . . . (St. Ex. 1, 00:25-00:42)

6

However, Nellie further testified, contrary to her statements to law enforcement and the
Physician’s Assistant, that her facial injuries were inflicted by her boyfriend Victor the
night before, stating, “when [Maldonado] had woke up . . . he seen my face and he was
pissed. He wanted to go after this guy.” (11/18/16 Tr., p.58, Ls.7-9.)

12

Nellie:

Oh, Carlos, show them, okay? You need to fucking show
them that you have some sort of fucking remorse and you
need help Carlos.

Maldonado:

I told them . . . .

Nellie:

If you don’t and you fight, if you fight this . . . . (St. Ex. 1,
00:55-1:00.)

Maldonado:

I told them I needed help man, I told them, I told them that I
need help . . . I promise you I did dude, But I didn’t fucking
tell them that I [. . .] that shit man. (St. Ex. 1, 01:13-01:25.)

Nellie:

You did? (St. Ex. 1, 01:26.)

Maldonado:

. . . I didn’t tell them I did that shit to you. (St. Ex. 1, 01:2901:31.)

Nellie:

I told them that we both needed help and that you weren’t
like this. You are not like this. (St. Ex. 1, 01:48-01:54.)

At the end of the call, Maldonado said “sorry babe” and “I’m so sorry.” (St. Ex. 1, 03:4404:05.)
In short, at the same time Maldonado was rehearsing a story to exculpate himself
in the courtroom, he was tacitly admitting that he battered Nellie by apologizing to her and
agreeing that he needed help.

2. Second Jail Call
In a second call from jail to Nellie on May 31, 2016, Maldonado asked what she
had said, and she told him that she did not tell “them” anything and that he “fucked [her]
up good.” (St. Ex. 2, 00:25-00:33; 11/18/16 Tr., p.224, L.19 – p.225, L.3.) After discussing
who had called the police that morning, Maldonado asked Nellie what she had said, and
she replied that she told them she did not want to talk to them right now, that they both
needed to get help, and she didn’t want him “to go to prison or anything like that.” (St. Ex.
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2, 01:03-01:26.) When Nellie asked Maldonado if he told them anything, he said he told
them he had been sick in bed, and that she had been in and out of the house, and when she
came back later on that night . . . “(inaudible) . . . oh shit man.” (St. Ex. 2, 01:45-02:12.)
Nellie immediately cut Maldonado off, saying, “babe, you can’t, listen,” and then the phone
call timed out. (St. Ex. 2, 02:13-02:15.)
Plainly, the primary purpose of the second phone call was to make sure that Nellie’s
version of the events coincided with Maldonado’s.

3. Third Jail Call
One week prior to trial, on November 10, 2016, Maldonado made another call from
jail to Nellie. (See St. Ex. 3.) Nellie told Maldonado, “that fucking Janell got fucking
served,” and when he asked what that meant, she said that she did not know. (St. Ex. 3,
01:20-01:27.) Maldonado told Nellie, “They don’t got to go, you know that, right? They
don’t get in trouble . . . hear me? (St. Ex. 3, 01:30-01:37.) Nellie said, “I keep telling them,
they’re all fucking retarded, man,” and Maldonado replied, “Well, you better stop telling
them and fucking start making them . . . nothing happens to ‘em babe, they get threatened
and threatened and threatened and nothing happens; that’s all that happens, it’s not a
charge, its nothing.” (St. Ex. 3, 01:38-02:06.) Nellie said “okay.” (St. Ex. 3, 02:12.)
Based on the third phone call, the trial court ruled, pursuant to I.R.E. 804(b)(5), that
Maldonado “engaged in wrongdoing that was intended to, and did, procure the
unavailability of [Janell Ozuna and Miriam Murillo] as [witnesses][,]” and therefore
allowed the absent witness’s recorded statements to be admitted as substantive evidence at
trial. (See generally 11/18/16 Tr., p.96, L.21 – p.104, L.6.)
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4. Fourth Jail Call
In a fourth jail call from Maldonado to Nellie, made on November 12, 2016, Nellie
said she had seen Janell Ozuna that morning, and asked Maldonado if it would be better if
she did go (presumably to the trial), and he said “yes.” (St. Ex. 25, 00:18-00:25.) When
Maldonado told Nellie that “they’re gonna dissect her,” she said that she would not tell her
to go. (St. Ex. 25, 00:48-01:05.) Maldonado explained that if she did not go, “then no
eyewitness, comprende?” (Nellie interjected that she understood), and “because of her shit
. . . her testimony, her statement, audio . . . that’s gonna fuck, but if she goes and tell ‘em I
was scared, this is what really happened and this is the reason why I said all that, uh, then
that dismisses all that and I get off.” (St. Ex. 25, 01:06-01:43.) Nellie agreed, and
Maldonado told her about another domestic violence case in which the defendant’s “old
lady got smart,” and because she did not testify, “no witness, no fucking charge.” (St. Ex.
25, 01:45-02:05.) Nellie responded, “I told you that from the fucking beginning and you
wouldn’t fucking listen to me man . . . I knew that, I fucking knew that!” (St. Ex. 25,
02:06-02:16.)

After further discussing his options on what to tell the two witnesses,

Maldonado said, “It’s okay . . . as long as they detract their shit, palabras,[7] then everything
will be okay, baby, okay?” (St. Ex. 25, 02:40-02:51.)
As in the third jail call, Maldonado’s fourth call attempts to undermine the judicial
process by making sure that Janell Ozuna either retracts her statements to law enforcement,
or simply fails to show up for trial. Significantly, Maldonado said that if Janell did not go

7

Joanna Torres, a Canyon County Victim Witness Coordinator, testified that she speaks
and understands Spanish and that the word “palabras” means “words.” (11/18/16 Tr.,
p.238, L.12 – p.239, L.11; p.243, L.25 – p.244, L.11.)
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to the trial, there would be no “eyewitness” – an indication that he considered Janell an
eyewitness to his – not Victor’s – commission of the crime.

5. Miriam Murillo’s Statement As Substantive Evidence
Miriam (Jeanette) Murillo testified through her recorded statement to Detective
Wilber (as substantive evidence) that Nellie had been living at Janell’s house for two to
three weeks, and that Maldonado had been staying there a couple of days before the May
31, 2016 incident. (St. Ex. 24, 02:30-02:50.) Miriam and her son stayed on one side of a
false wall of a room in the downstairs area, and Nellie and Maldonado stayed on the other
side of the wall. (St. Ex. 24, 01:20-01:09.) When Miriam got up to go to the bathroom at
about 5:00 a.m., she heard Nellie crying and when she asked her if she was okay,
Maldonado said, “get the fuck out of here.” (St. Ex. 24, 04:50-6:00.) Most significantly,
Miriam heard a hitting or slapping noise two times, like skin on skin, followed by Nellie
crying, and Maldonado telling Nellie to shut up. (St. Ex. 24, 04:57-08:27; 11:00-11:25.)
Miriam went upstairs and got Janell to go back downstairs with her. (St. Ex. 24,
11:25-11:30.) Maldonado told Janell there was nothing wrong and he was just talking to
Nellie. (St. Ex. 24, 07:20-07:25.) When Janell asked Nellie if she was okay, Nellie told
Janell, “don’t leave me alone.” (St. Ex. 24, 06:20-07:00.)

6. Janell Ozuna’s Statement As Substantive Evidence
Janell Ozuna, the owner of the house, was woken up early in the morning on May
31, 2016, by Miriam, who told her to “come quickly, he’s got a knife and he gonna hurt
her.” (St. Ex. 22, 00:20-00:49.) When she got downstairs, she opened the curtain that hung
in the room’s doorway and said “Carlos, come here please,” and he told her to leave him
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alone, get away, and that he was going to hit her. (St. Ex. 22, 00:50-01:28; 11/18/16 Tr.,
p.133, Ls.18-24.) Maldonado told Nellie that she better tell him the truth. (St. Ex. 22,
01:27-01:40.) Janell told Maldonado to “just come here,” and he told her to get out; this
time he turned towards Janell and started walking to her, so she shut the curtain. (St. Ex.
22, 01:50-02:05.) Janell saw that Maldonado held a knife with the blade exposed in his
left hand. (St. Ex. 22, 02:10-02:35.)

7. Nellie’s Injuries And Demeanor
Nellie suffered obvious traumatic injury to her face, as evidence by close-up photos
of her face that were admitted at trial. 8 (See State’s Exhibits 13, 14, and 15.) Although,
Physician Assistant Nelson testified that Nellie did not have any broken bones, her injuries
were serious enough to cause her to undergo two CT scans (one to determine if there was
any cranial bleeding, another to see if there were “any fractures or processes” to her facial
bones), and she was physically examined to determine if any of her ribs were broken.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.46, L.12 – p.47, L.19.) Mr. Nelson explained that the swelling around
Nellie’s eyes was “impressive,” meaning that (on a rating from mild, moderate, severe or
impressive), “in this case, walk in the room and it’s obvious from across the room that
there’s swelling in the area.” (11/18/16 Tr., p.47, L.20 – p.48, L.7.)
Captain Curt Shankel testified that, after responding to the house, he found Nellie
behind a door to the downstairs laundry room crying, apparently frightened, “just making

8

The distinct element between felony domestic violence and misdemeanor domestic
battery is the infliction of a traumatic injury. Compare I.C. § 18-918(2)(a) with I.C. § 18918(3)(b). “‘Traumatic injury’ means a condition of the body, such as a wound or external
or internal injury, whether of a minor or serious nature, caused by physical force.” I.C.
§ 18-918(1)(b). There is no question that Nellie suffered a traumatic injury.
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herself small,” and “[s]he had the hands up and was shaking.” 9 (11/17/16 Tr., p.289, L.24
– p.290, L.8; p.294, Ls.2-7.) When the Captain reached out to her and asked her to come
out, “she just stayed there.” (11/17/16 Tr., p.294, Ls.11-14.) Corporal Tonna Marek also
went to the residence and described Nellie as “crying, shaking, [and] extremely fearful.”
(11/17/16 Tr., p.305, Ls.10-15; see also St. Ex. 4 (Corporal Marek’s video recording of her
contact with Nellie at the residence).)

8. Summary
In light of the trial testimony, as outlined above, there is no reasonable possibility
that the challenged statements (i.e., Nellie’s statements to the paramedic and Physician’s
Assistant identifying the batterer) affected the outcome of Maldonado’s trial. If there was
error, it was harmless.

II.
The Statement By Nellie About Maldonado Having Been In Prison Did Not Constitute
Reversible Error Because It Did Not Deprive Maldonado Of A Fair Trial
A.

Introduction
During trial, the state inadvertently admitted and published a tape-recorded

interview of Nellie by Detective Marang in which she said that Maldonado had been “in
prison for a long time,” and “in prison . . . state of mind where you don’t like to be
disrespected.” (St. Ex. 23, 05:30-05:45.) Maldonado moved for a mistrial (11/18/16 Tr.,
p.127, Ls.9-10), which was denied by the trial court (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, Ls.5-7). On

9

Nellie’s mother, Ysabel Castro, had received a text message from another daughter that
alarmed her, and she called 911 before driving to the Nampa residence where Nellie was
staying, and the police had already arrived. (11/17/16 Tr., p.258, L.5 – p. 263, L.22.)
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appeal, Maldonado contends the trial court committed reversible error in denying his
motion. Maldonado’s argument fails.

B.

Standard Of Review
The standard of review applicable to the denial of a motion for mistrial is well

established. State v. Ruiz, 159 Idaho 722, 724, 366 P.3d 644, 646 (Ct. App. 2015).
[T]he question on appeal is not whether the trial judge reasonably exercised
his discretion in light of circumstances existing when the mistrial motion
was made. Rather, the question must be whether the event which
precipitated the motion for mistrial represented reversible error when
viewed in the context of the full record. Thus, where a motion for mistrial
has been denied in a criminal case, the “abuse of discretion” standard is a
misnomer. The standard, more accurately stated, is one of reversible error.
Our focus is upon the continuing impact on the trial of the incident that
triggered the mistrial motion. The trial judge’s refusal to declare a mistrial
will be disturbed only if that incident, viewed retrospectively, constituted
reversible error.
Id. (citing State v. Urquhart, 105 Idaho 92, 95, 665 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Ct. App. 1983)). “An
error is harmless, not necessitating reversal, if the reviewing court is able to declare beyond
a reasonable doubt that the error did not contribute to the verdict.” Id. (citing State v. Perry,
150 Idaho 209, 227, 245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010); State v. Watkins, 152 Idaho 764, 766, 274
P.3d 1279, 1281 (Ct. App. 2012)).

C.

Factual Background
The statement from Nellie to Detective Marang about Maldonado having been in

prison does not constitute reversible error. “A mistrial may be declared on motion of the
defendant when there occurs during the trial, either inside or outside the courtroom, an
error or legal defect in the proceedings, or conduct that is prejudicial to the defendant and
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deprives the defendant of a fair trial.” I.C.R. 29.1. The statement made by Nellie did not
deprive Maldonado of a fair trial. I.C.R. 29.1.
Although the prosecutor had prepared a redacted version of Nellie’s interview
which omitted her reference to prison (see St. Ex. 5), he inadvertently gained admission
(through Detective Marang’s testimony) of Nellie’s unredacted taped interview (see St. Ex.
23) and published it to the jury over Maldonado’s “hearsay” objection. (11/18/16 Tr.,
p.119, L.15 – p.121, L.16; p.127, Ls.20-23; p.154, Ls.10-15.) After Detective Marang was
excused, Maldonado’s attorney informed the court that “in the audio [Nellie] makes
reference [that] Carlos spent time in prison and that he felt, you know, disrespected[,]” and
requested a mistrial. (11/18/16 Tr., p.126, L.21 – p.127, L.10.) The trial judge said that he
had not heard that comment when it was first published, but when the issue was taken up
again later during the jury’s lunch break, the court replayed State’s Exhibit 23 and heard
Nellie say, in effect, “He’s been in prison for a long time and he doesn’t like the disrespect.”
(11/18/16 Tr., p.150, L.17 – p.151, L.22.)
After protracted discussion and argument, the trial court denied Maldonado’s
mistrial motion (11/18/16 Tr., p.169, Ls.5-7), and instructed the jury as follows:
In addition, portions of State’s Exhibit Number 23, an audio recording of
Detective Marang’s interview with Nelida Maldonado, were played into the
record also under the same limiting instructions by the Court.
However, because I have determined that that recording
inadvertently contained information that is inadmissible, I am now ruling
that the audio recording of Exhibit 23 is to be stricken from the record. And
you are instructed that you are to disregard anything you may have heard or
understood from the Exhibit 23 audio recording of Nelida Maldonado.
(11/18/16 Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.176, L.11.)
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After five more witnesses testified, the state recalled Detective Marang, who
testified that State’s Exhibit 5 was a recording of his taped interview with Nellie that had
been redacted to conform with the court’s prior order (in regard to stricken St. Ex. 23), and
agreed that he “heard some things that have been taken out.” (11/18/16 Tr., p.245, L.15 –
p.246, L.7.) Maldonado’s counsel said he had “the same objection that I made previously,”
which was a hearsay objection. (11/18/16 Tr., p.119, Ls.15-18; p.246, Ls.11-15.) The trial
court admitted States Exhibit 5 into evidence with the admonition that it was being offered
for statements made by Nellie that may not be consistent with her trial testimony. (11/18/16
Tr., p.246, L.16 – p.247, L.9.)

D.

The Statement By Nellie Did Not Constitute Reversible Error Because It Did Not
Deprive Maldonado Of A Fair Trial
“A mistrial may be declared, upon the defendant’s motion, if there has been an error

or legal defect during the trial which is prejudicial to the defendant and deprives the
defendant of a fair trial.” State v. Dopp, 129 Idaho 597, 603, 930 P.2d 1039, 1045 (Ct.
App. 1996) (citing I.C.R. 29.1); accord, e.g., Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646. “The
admission of improper evidence does not automatically require the declaration of a
mistrial.” Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646 (citing State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 631,
97 P.3d 1014, 1020 (Ct. App. 2004)). Rather, “[t]he core inquiry” when denial of a mistrial
is challenged on appeal is “whether it appears from the record that the event triggering the
mistrial motion contributed to the verdict, leaving the appellate court with a reasonable
doubt that the jury would have reached the same result had the event not occurred.” State
v. Palin, 106 Idaho 70, 75, 675 P.2d 49, 54 (Ct. App. 1983).
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In conducting this inquiry, the appellate court “normally presume[s] that a jury will
follow an instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence.” Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274
P.3d at 1283; accord Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724, 366 P.3d at 646.

To overcome the

presumption, a defendant claiming error in the denial of a mistrial motion must show “there
is an overwhelming probability that the jury [was] unable to follow the court’s instructions
and a strong likelihood that the effect of the evidence [was] devastating to the defendant.”
Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 724-25, 366 P.3d at 646-47 (citing Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at
1020). Where, as here, a defendant claims a curative instruction was insufficient to remedy
the prejudicial effect of inadmissible evidence, the appellate court’s analysis focuses not
only on the curative instruction, but also on the “strength of the evidence” and “the
significance of the improperly disclosed information.” Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274
P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647.
Contrary to Maldonado’s assertions on appeal, application of the above principles
to the facts of this case shows that Nellie’s statement to Detective Marang about
Maldonado having been in prison a long time and disliking being disrespected, though
inadmissible, was harmless and did not necessitate a mistrial. After the court was informed
of the inadvertent admission and publication of Nellie’s improper comments, it
acknowledged that they “could cause the jurors unfair prejudice” against Maldonado.
(11/18/16, p.157, Ls.4-6.)

After much discussion and argument, the court denied

Maldonado’s motion for a mistrial, but took the curative measures of striking the entire
recording (St. Ex. 23) from the record and instructing the jury “to disregard anything you
may have heard or understood from the Exhibit 23 audio recording of Nelida

22

Maldonado.” 10 (11/18/16 Tr., p.175, L.25 – p.176, L.11.) The court later instructed the
jury that it was to “decide the facts from all the evidence presented in the case” and
reminded it that “[c]ertain things you have heard or seen are not evidence, including …
testimony that has been excluded or stricken, or which you have been instructed to
disregard.” (11/21/16 Tr., p.10, Ls.7-22.) “Absent compelling circumstances dictating the
opposite conclusion,” the court’s curative instructions must be deemed to have been “an
effective remedy” for any potential prejudice occasioned by Nellie’s comment about
“prison.” State v. Frauenberger, 154 Idaho 294, 302, 297 P.3d 257, 265 (Ct. App. 2013)
(citing Watkins, 152 Idaho at 767-69, 274 P.3d at 1282-84)).
Maldonado points out that when the prosecutor laid the foundation for subsequently
admitting the properly redacted recording of Nellie’s interview (St. Ex. 5) into evidence,
he asked Detective Marang, “Have you heard ‘some things’ that have ‘been taken out’[?]”
and the detective answered “Yes.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.24 (quoting 11/18/16 Tr., p.246,
Ls.24-25 (emphasis added).) Based in part on that exchange, Maldonado contends that,
“[e]ven with the district court’s instruction, the jurors were likely unable to put the
prejudicial information out of their minds because they were reminded of it when Detective
Marang testified about it again and when they could listen to the redacted audio of the
interview as they deliberated.” (Appellant’s Brief, p.25.) Maldonado’s argument that the
prosecutor’s reference to “some things” that have “been taken out” improperly drew the

10

In part, the trial court relied upon State v. Fluery, 123 Idaho 9, 843 P.2d 159 (Ct. App.
1992), in which the Idaho Court of Appeals affirmed the measure employed by the trial
court in curing improper (and unsolicited) testimony that Fluery’s probation officer was
with police when Fluery was arrested; the Court approved the trial court’s striking of the
entire testimony surrounding Fluery’s arrest with a limiting instruction. (11/18/16 Tr.,
p.155, L.21 - p.156, L.9.) Similar to Maldonado’s trial, the improper testimony in Fluery
had been made inadvertently. Fluery, 123 Idaho at 11, 843 P.2d at 161.
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jury’s attention to Nellie’s “prison” comments is not persuasive. In laying a foundation to
admit State’s Exhibit 5, it was necessary for the prosecutor to show that the recording had
been altered – i.e., that “some things” had “been taken out.” There is nothing about that
innocuous remark that would have made the jury disregard the trial court’s instructions
instead of rendering a verdict based solely on the admissible evidence that overwhelmingly
established Maldonado’s guilt.
Indeed, Idaho appellate courts have repeatedly held that a brief reference to the
defendant being in custody does not deprive him of a fair trial where the district court
instructs the jury to disregard the comment. See State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 601, 768
P.2d 1331, 1334 (1989); State v. Hill, 140 Idaho 625, 630-31, 97 P.3d 1014, 1019-20 (Ct.
App. 2004).
In Hedger, when the prosecutor asked the victim how she knew that she had locked
her windows on the night of her attack, the victim testified that she “made double sure since
the time [the defendant] had gotten out of jail.” 115 Idaho at 601, 768 P.2d at 1334. The
prosecutor then asked when the defendant “got out of jail,” and the victim testified that the
defendant “got out of jail on a Tuesday, the Tuesday before the 9th.” Id. Similar to
Maldonado’s case, the district court in Hedger struck the testimony, instructed the jury to
disregard it, and denied the defendant’s motion for a mistrial. Id. The Idaho Supreme
Court held “there was no error in the trial court’s handling of the issue” because, where
improper testimony is introduced “and the trial court promptly instructs the jury to
disregard the evidence, it must be presumed that the jury obeyed the trial court’s direction
entirely.” Id.; see Hill, 140 Idaho at 631, 97 P.3d at 1020 (holding defendant had fair trial
where prosecutor asked when witness “spoke to [the defendant] in jail” and the district
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court “instructed the jury to disregard the prosecutor’s question”); see also State v.
Harrison, 136 Idaho 504, 507, 37 P.3d 1, 4 (Ct. App. 2001) (holding prosecutor’s references
to defendant’s “custody status” did not affect the outcome of the trial even where the
district court did not instruct the jury to disregard all of the references).
Even if the curative instruction is not itself determinative, this Court can
nevertheless easily conclude the stricken testimony was harmless because the state
presented overwhelming evidence of Maldonado’s guilt. Watkins, 152 Idaho at 768, 274
P.3d at 1283; Ruiz, 159 Idaho at 725, 366 P.3d at 647. As demonstrated above, the state’s
evidence showing that Maldonado was the person who battered Nellie and caused her to
suffer traumatic injury was not just compelling, it was overwhelming. For the reasons set
forth in Section I.D., supra (regarding harmless error), and relied upon here, the state’s
evidence convincingly showed that Maldonado was guilty of felony domestic battery.
Considering the strength of the evidence and the trial court’s curative instructions,
there is no reasonable possibility that the stricken statement by Nellie regarding Maldonado
having been in prison contributed to the jury’s verdict. Maldonado has failed to show the
trial court erred in denying his motion for a mistrial.

III.
Maldonado Has Failed To Show Cumulative Error
Under the doctrine of cumulative error, a series of errors, harmless in themselves,
may in the aggregate show the absence of a fair trial. State v. Martinez, 125 Idaho 445,
453, 872 P.2d 708, 716 (1994). A necessary predicate to application of the doctrine is a
finding of more than one error. State v. Hawkins, 131 Idaho 396, 958 P.2d 22 (Ct. App.
1998).
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Maldonado has failed to show that two or more errors occurred in his trial, and
therefore the doctrine is inapplicable to this case. See, e.g., LaBelle v. State, 130 Idaho
115, 121, 937 P.2d 427, 433 (Ct. App. 1997). Even if errors in the trial had been shown,
they would not amount to a denial of due process that would require reversal. State v.
Gray, 129 Idaho 784, 804, 932 P.2d 907, 927 (Ct. App. 1997); State v. Barcella, 135 Idaho
191, 204, 16 P.3d 288, 301 (Ct. App. 2000) (accumulation of errors deemed harmless).

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Maldonado’s judgment of
conviction.
DATED this 5th day of April, 2018.

/s/ John C. McKinney__________________
JOHN C. McKINNEY
Deputy Attorney General
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